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Tin-. TiiRhK'iioijR stretch of road between Hazaribagh and Dhanbad in eastern 
India is as desolate as it is beautiful. One winter evening, some half a dozen 
years ago, as I was traveling ibis route by taxi to catch a train from Dhanbad 
to get to Calcutta, 1 was lucky—or, 1 suppose, unlucky, depending on one’s 
point of view—to be stopped by a road block created by a gang of youngsters 
wielding lathis' and swords. In front of us. also slopped by the ramshackle 
road block, was a truck, and some of (he youngsters were talking to the truck 
driver. From the sight of some distant lanterns I figured that we were close to 
a village. My taxi driver looked very nervous as lie wailed for the youngsters 
to come to our ear. He told me that they were hoodlums, collecting illegal 
money by threatening to beat up passengers and drivers. He asked me not to 
speak and to leave it all to him. Eventually, a bearded young man walked up 
to our car regally anti asked me to lower my window glass. He spoke courte­
ously and explained that he was collecting rangdari tax. He had a wad of 
papers in one hand (the other held a lathi) and he explained that after we paid 
the money, which, he added firmly, we would have to. he would even give us 
a receipt.
1 had read about the institution of rangdari tax found to occur in some parts 
of India. The “tax” is an illegal collection made by gangs in remote rural areas 
where the hand of the law is lax. The reason 1 felt lucky about the incident 
was that this experienee is very rare for an urban Indian, and it subsequently 
made me think hard about the meaning of law and norms, and 1 owe a pan of 
this paper to the incident.
This is unimportant for my present paper, but I must linisli the story. My 
taxi driver, despite the cold sweat, was not one to give up. He got into an 
argument and was soon asked to get down from the car and talk to the boss, 
who stood with others a little farther away. Several minutes passed heforc he 
returned, the bamboo road block was removed, and its we sped away toward 
Dhanbad, he explained bow we got away without paying. His arguments in 
the beginning fell on deaf ears be said. Then he suddenly changed tack and 
explained that I was a visitor from Delhi who had come to see rural Bihar, and
it would create a very' bad impression on me if I were forced to make a pay­
ment. This appeal to regional pride clicked and, like some visiting ambassa­
dors, we were allowed to go without paying local dues.
There are several features of this little incident that shed light on the func­
tioning of an economy and also cast shadows on our textbook models. First, 
what the youngsters were offering us was, at a certain level of abstraction, like 
any exchange. If we wanted our arms intact and heads not bruised, we would 
have to pay them some money. In oilier words, they were selling nonviolence. 
And most people, like the trucker ahead of us (and I, for that matter), thought 
it was a good bargain. A small sum of money in exchange for no bodily harm 
seemed well worth it. But note that what they were selling was what in most 
societies is treated as belonging to the buyer’s endowment. If 1 wanted my arm 
unharmed, I would have to pay him. In textbook economics we usually treat 
individual endowments as beyond the reach of others. But in reality, individu­
als often encroach on each others endowments, selling to i what in most socie­
ties would be considered as belonging to i. This happens between powerful 
landlords and poor serfs: between big countries and small countries; between 
big corporations and small companies. Evidently, the theorem that individuals, 
left to themselves, lead to an efficient society, is predicated on the assumption 
that agents respect each other's endowments. But to the extent that they do not 
do so in reality, this claim that individual rationality is enough to create an 
efficient society is false or. at best, remains to be established.
The other matter on which the incident sheds light is the meaning of the 
law. Virtually all accounts in the Indian press have described the mngdari 
lax as illegal extortion. Yet it is impossible not to notice bow analogous it 
is to a regular tax. It is not paid by people voluntarily but needs the threat 
of punitive action. The fact that the extortion was taking place so close to a 
village makes it plausible that it has some legitimacy in the eyes of (he villag­
ers.' In all likelihood a part of the money is spent on local village welfare, with 
the remainder being used by the lax collectors on themselves. This is antilogous 
to the uses to which government lax revenue is put. In brief, the institution 
that I had chanced upon that evening was pretty much like a local government. 
It is considered illegal only because it commits acts that, in the eves of what 
we consider the real government, are illegal, though in essence the actions arc 
similar to the real government’s own actions. Hence, as per common usage, 
the institution of the rangdari lax cannot be thought of as supported by the 
law and the threat of state penalty; it is supported by norms and informal 
threats. But what, really, is the difference between a law and a norm? There 
are several differences to be sure, but at some level they are indistinguishable 
from each other. The latter is a nontrivial claim and is one of the central 
theorems of this paper. It will be called the con: theorem. It expresses a view­
point that can have important influence on the way we conceptualize the
role of law in economics, as will be argued in a later section. It is not a theorem 
in the sense of geometry or even axiomatic economics, which can be mathe­
matically proved, but a point of view to which I aspire to convert the reader 
through examples, arguments, and persuasion. It is formalizable, but only po­
tentially so.
The core theorem and the discussion around it are related to the research in 
economics often called the new or positive political economy,J and is part of 
the older “institutional economics." My method of analysis, relying on game- 
theoretic constructions, is similar to the method used in this new literature. 
But at the same time my central claims, embodied in and stemming from the 
core theorem, diverges from the view that is taken in the literature on political 
economy. Moreover. I do not share the confidence of this new literature, with 
w'hich economists—ready with their median voter theorems and techniques of 
optimization— have rushed to explain the rise and fall of nations: why some 
dictators ruin nations and others bring prosperity, why one government loses 
the election and another one does not, and why democracies appear when they 
do and why they do not when they do not (hindsight being never too far away 
from these analyses). I do not think we are in a position to answer such large 
questions. But I know that a group of people all praising one another for their 
understanding of these questions and at the same time trying to outdo one 
another can create a “cult effect,” where knowledge is replaced by illusion. 
This essay has a much more limited objective: to expose some flaws in our 
thinking that lie at the base of conventional economics and even the new politi­
cal economy, and to provide the preliminaries for a large program that lies 
mostly ahead.
If I owe a part of my interest in this area of research to rural Bihar, I also 
owe apart to the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton. I came to the Institute 
with a fledgling interest in power and the politics of oppression. I had argued 
in my paper “One Kind of Power" that we needed to move away from tradi­
tional dyadic economics to the economics of triads if we were to incorporate 
the role of power and influence in our models.4 During the year that I spent at 
the Institute, 1985-86. I was fortunate to have been able to collaborate with 
two remarkable economists. Eric Jones and Ekkehart Schlicht. We brought our 
respective skills to write a critique—in the original sense of the word “cri­
tique." that is, as evaluation—of the new institutional economics. In writing 
the paper that came out of this collaboration,5 1 learned a lot about historical 
methods and institutional economics. We were touching on several issues of 
political economy, which was then far from being a discipline in vogue.
In the next two sections I shall comment on social norms, and law and 
economics. Finally, I shall try to present what I believe is a new approach to 
the study of political economy.
Social Norms
Assumptions in economics have been at the receiving end of a lot of atten­
tion. They have been reviled for their unrealism, admired for their elegance, 
the mainspring of jokes, appreciated for their explanatory powers, and dis­
missed as untenable. All this attention, however, has been directed at the ex­
plicit assumptions, such as the transitivity of preference, or the convexity of 
technology. What has gone virtually unnoticed and therefore eluded criticism 
arc the implicit assumptions. Yet the most untenable assumptions often belong 
to this category'. One such assumption is the existence of social norms. Much 
of economics has been written up as if social norms do not matter. This is 
empirically false, as virtually all economists and certainly other social scien­
tists will agree. What is more interesting is that it is, in all likelihood, analyti­
cally flawed as well. That is, a norms-free economics may not be possible. 
Hence, when we write up a model with no reference to norms and institutions, 
we arc nevertheless using norms and institutions, but doing so unwittingly.
This is best illustrated by the act of exchange. According to the first princi­
ples of economics, two agents will exchange or trade goods if the following 
assumptions are true: (a) each individual prefers having more goods to less; 
(b) each person satisfies the law of diminishing marginal utility;" and (c) the 
initial endowment of goods is lopsided, for example, one person has all the 
butter and the other all the bread. To many economists, (a), (b), and (c) are 
indeed sufficient conditions for trade to occur. What they do not realize is that 
these are sufficient only when the agents arc already embedded in a certain 
institutional environment and characterized by adequate social norms.7 For 
one, exchange is greatly facilitated by the ability to communicate or, even 
better, to speak a common language. And given that language is after all an 
evolved social convention,5 trade and exchange are predicated on social con­
ventions.
The importance of these implicit requirements for trade can be inferred from 
some experiments in economics, which were conducted for a different purpose. 
Experiments have shown that rats do prefer more to less—a fact that 1 sus­
pected well before I read experimental economics. Furthermore, experiments 
have established that rats also satisfy the law of diminishing marginal utlity 
or, more precisely, have convex preference. This was established by some 
innovative experiments conducted by Kagel et al. on white albino rats, belong­
ing to the—this for the connoisseur—Wistar and Sprague-Dawlcy stock.'* So, 
rats do satisfy our assumptions (a) and (b). All that remained to be done to 
check the exchange hypothesis was to give different kinds of food to different 
rats, which would fulfill assumption (c), and see what the rats did. It seems 
some relentless researchers did just that."' They presumably placed two rats at 
some distance, with each possessing a different food item. The researchers
discovered that, though these rats satisfied assumptions (a), (b), and (c), they 
did not, alas, indulge in trade and exchange. I feel I could have predicted this 
from my occasional encounter with rats, but it is anyway good to have these 
things experimentally confirmed.
Facetious though it may sound, the above account does amount to a very 
substantial critique of traditional economics. It shows that even in models 
which seem transparently free of any requirements of norms and institutions, 
that is not the case. Market-related activity, trade, and other economic function­
ings have to be embedded in institutions and social norms.11 If we refuse to 
embed our models consciously, we will still be doing so, only unwittingly. And 
given that the latter is not such a wise approach, it is important that we recog­
nize the role that social norms play and try to build these in consciously and 
in keeping with reality.
Before venturing to discuss different kinds of norms and critiquing main­
stream economics, I want to pul in a word of caution. That mainstream eco­
nomics has ignored social norms is quite evident: one has simply to browse 
through a few random books of economics to verify the claim. That social 
norms arc an important part of reality is also obvious enough. But these two 
facts are not reason enough for criticizing mainstream economics. Something 
can be an important part of life but not important for the research one is in­
volved in. Indeed, for some of the core concerns of mainstream economics the 
social norm was not germane. Moreover, economists were wary of using a 
concept that was so vaguely defined that it could be used to explain almost 
everything, thereby falling into a tautological trap, a danger that has been 
pointed to by Solow.12
This justification for keeping norms out of our analysis, however, has grown 
weaker over the years, As economists have reached out to addressing larger 
questions, concerning political economy and law and economics, the silence 
on social norms has become less defensible. Moreover, with the rise in game 
theory, wc have within our ambit methods for formalizing and giving more 
rigorous definition to different concepts of norms.
For the purposes of economic analysis, norms are best divided into three 
kinds: rationality-limiting norms, preference-changing norms, and equilib­
rium-selection norms.11 By a “rationality-limiting norm” I mean a norm that 
stops us from doing certain things or choosing certain options irrespective of 
how much utility that thing or option gives us. Thus most individuals would 
not consider filching another person’s wallet even if it were lying unattended, 
not by speculating about the amount the wallet is likely to contain, the chances 
of getting caught, the severity of the law, and so on, but because they consider 
stealing wallets as something that is simply no: done.
In traditional economics, the "feasible set” of alternatives facing an individ­
ual (from which the person can pick one) is defined in terms of technological 
or budgetary feasibility. Thus a consumer’s feasible set is the collection of all
the combinations of goods and services that the consumer can purchase given 
his or her income. From the above discussion it should be evident that a ratio­
nality-limiting norm further limits the feasible set, because now certain alterna­
tives may be infeasible to an individual not just because it is technologically 
infeasible (like walking on water) or budgetarily infeasible (like buying a Jag­
uar car) but because it is ruled out by the person's norms. Indeed, a person 
with norms may let go on options that could have enhanced his utility,1,1 and 
thus such a person would be considered irrational in terms of traditional eco­
nomics. Basically, such norms limit the domain over which the rationality 
calculus is applied.
Elsewhere I have taken the line that we can, at least partially, understand 
why some norms exist and some do not, in terms of evolutionary stability'.1-' 
According to this argument, we do not see any society with the norm that one 
must not eat proteins simply because such a society would perish along with 
its norm. Similarly, wc do not find any society where stealing anything from 
anyone is considered legitimate because such a society would soon be iu com­
plete chaos, become impoverished, and wither away.
On Forest Home Drive in Ithaca there is a bridge on which two cars cannot 
cross at the same time. When wc were small we were told how in the Andes 
there are pathways along steep mountains that are so uarrow that two persons 
cannot cross; and so when two persons found themselves face to face on one 
of these paths, the one with the quicker draw survived by shooting the other 
person and continued on his journey. In Ithaca a different norm is used. Cars 
pass in little convoys, three or four at a time, and the convoys from the two 
directions alternate. That is, after the third or fourth car ahead goes, one just 
stops and wails for an oncoming convoy and then starts once again. This stop­
ping and wailing is against one’s self-interest, so it is indeed a rationality- 
limiting norm, but the reason we find some norm of this kind and not the 
Andean custom of a shoot-out is that it is evolutionarily more stable. This is 
also the reason that the “Andes custom” probably exists nowhere. A society 
practicing this norm would not survive and so neither would the norm.
Some may argue that instead of thinking that such norms limit individual 
rationality, we can simply redefine our utility function so that what I described 
above as uormatively infeasible is described as an option that gives a very 
low utility, perhaps negative infinity. But that would reduce utility theory' to a 
sterile tautology. In reality, moreover, there are certain things we would love 
to do but our norms get in the way. We would not have to ask the lord to 
deliver us from evil if the evil gave us such disutility that it was no temptation 
to start with.
This does not mean that norms never change our preference or utility func­
tion. Certain norms do get internalized. There are many individuals whose 
religion requires them to be vegetarian, and they tell you that they find nonveg­
etarian food revolting anyway. More often than not, this is no coincidence: a
religious norm adhered to over a stretch of time often gets internalized so that 
one begins to actually prefer what the norm requires one to do. This can explain 
why one finds systematic variations in taste across regions and nations. What 
starts out as a norm or a custom can, over time, become part of one’s prefer­
ence. Such a norm may be referred to as a “preference-changing norm.” 1'’ Since 
such a norm works through an individual's preference, it can be ignored by 
traditional economics, which treats preferences as primitives. The only reason 
for being aware of this kind of a norm is that it can give us an understanding 
of how some of our preferences are formed.
This essay, however, is concerned with neither rationality-limiting norms 
nor preference-changing norms but rather with norms that have no effect on 
individual preference nor the feasible set from which a person chooses, but 
those that help coordinate actions across human beings. Consider the norm of 
driving on the right in the United States. It is true that this norm is additionally 
fortified by the law; but it is arguable that even if this were just a norm or 
custom and not the law, people would still drive on the right.17 This is because 
this norm, once it is in place, happens to be entirely compatible with self- 
interested behavior. In the absence of such a norm, there are at least two possi­
ble equilibriums—everyone drives on the left or everyone drives on the right. 
The norm simply helps people to select an equilibrium. It is for this reason 
that I call such a norm an "equilibrium-selection norm."
According to this terminology, Akcrlof's conception of caste is that of an 
equilibrium-selection norm.ls In my model of totalitarian states,19 people mimic 
loyalty to the totalitarian regime not because that is their preference but be­
cause the expression of loyalty is an equilibrium-selection norm. If others show 
loyalty to the regime it is in your self-interest to also show loyalty to the 
regime. Since this can be true for all individuals, the entire display of loyally 
in some totalitarian slates can be superficial, an exercise in mimicry' from 
which no individual would want to deviate.
David Lewis’s idea of a “convention" is also close to this kind of social 
norm. More recently. Cooler,7'1 in discussing the connection between norms 
and law, has identified norms entirely with equilibrium-selection norms. He 
describes a “social norm" as an "effective consensus obligation,’’ and he goes 
on to identify a consensus obligation with an equilibrium of a garne.:i
Since most of this essay will focus on norms of this kind, from here on the 
term norm should be taken to mean an equilibrium-selection norm, unless 
explicitly stated otherwise.
L aw’s Economy
The standard view of law in economics and related social sciences is of 
something that changes the set of strategies open to an individual, or the “pay­
off function” of the individual. If the law does not permit emitting pollutants
into the atmosphere, then the payoff that I expect when I build a factory that 
freely emits pollutants into the atmosphere will be different front the payoff I 
would expect from the factory if the law of the land had nothing against pollut­
ants. In the former case, in addition to the profits from sales, I would have to 
calculate the probability of being caught and fined and adjust that against my 
expected profit in order to get to the expected payoff.
This view is predicated on a conception of the economy as a game. In other 
words, each individual in the economy is supposed to have a (feasible) set of 
“strategies,” or actions, open to him or her. The payoff that each individual, 
or “player,” receives depends on the strategies chosen by all the players—often 
referred to as a "tuple of strategies." The payoff is a number that expresses the 
net utility that a player receives from the state of the world that emerges when 
every' player has picked a strategy from his or her set of strategies. The rule 
that summarizes the payoff received by each player for every possible tuple 
of strategics is called a “payoff function,” This is the view taken, implicitly or 
explicitly, in virtually all works of law and economics. It is an idea often 
associated with Pigou and referred to as the “Pigovian view”"  and is quite 
explicit in, for instance, Baird, Gertner, and Picker7’ and Benoit and Kom- 
hauser.1,1 It is possible to contest this view of the economy, but that is not my 
purpose here; indeed, it seems to me to be an adequate model for most pur­
poses.J! What I want to focus on is the role of law in such an economy.
As just explained, according to the traditional view, a law is something that 
changes the “economy game" by altering the payoff functions of players for 
by limiting the set of strategies open to a player'1). In other words, according 
to this view, a new law typically alters the payoff that a person expects from 
certain actions. Thus Baird. Gertner and Picker observe, “Wc can capture the 
change in the legal rules by changing the payoffs.”77 And given that the payoffs 
are an integral part of a game, a law is treated as something that changes the 
game.
This has an immediate appeal. Consider a new law that raises the income 
lax rate. The payoff that one now expects to earn front eight hours of work 
will be less than what one would have earned from the same action or strategy 
earlier. Likewise with the example of the pollution law above. I shall, however, 
argue that, while this ubiquitous view of law serves well for some limited 
purposes, it is fundamentally flawed. The law needs to be understood very 
differently if we arc to get a better grip on reality while building models of 
economics.
Lav.' and Economi cs : C ritique and a N ew Approach
The standard view of the role of law in an economy would be right if it were 
the case that the economy game is one that is played only by the “nongovern­
mental” individuals in society. That is, if the police, the tax collectors, and the
judges were agents exogenous lo the game, who mechanically went about 
doing what the law required them to do, then indeed for the other people in 
the society (that is, for the players of the game) a law would be something Lhal 
determined the game by fixing the payoff function; and so a change in the 
legal regime would amount to a change of the game.
But in reality those who work for government—the police, the district judge, 
the tax collector, the bureaucrat, the individuals in the pollution control depart­
ment, and so on—are also individuals with their own motivations, dreams, 
striving, and cunning. Hence they arc also players and should not be treated 
as exogenous lo the economy game. This fact, in itself, is now recognized in 
the new literature on economics and government.2''
What is not always recognized is that this throws a wrench in the traditional 
models of law and economics. Morevcr, even those economists who recognize 
the significance ofendogenizing the "law enforcer" balk at taking this idea all 
the way to its natural conclusion; and they lend to err on the side of the tradi­
tional approach in their instinctive moments.
Note that whether a particular law is there or not, the policeman’s, the tax 
collector's, and the judge’s sets of strategies remain the same. And if every­
body behaves the same way, whether or not the law is there, everybody must 
get the same payoff. Hence, the law cannot change the payoff function either.
Consider, for example, the case of antipollution law. Whether or not the law 
is there, the strategies open to the policeman include (a) arrest a person who 
emits pollutants and (b) not arrest a person who emits pollutants; the strategies 
open to the judge include (1) punish the policeman who arrests a person who 
pollutes the atmosphere and (2) punish the policemen who docs not arrest a 
person who pollutes the atmosphere.2' Now if—whether or not the law is 
there—the person, the policeman, and the judge behave the same way, then 
the person, the policeman, and the judge will gel the same payoff. Hence, the 
game played by all the individuals in the economy is unaffected by the law.
If the enforcers of the law or the agents of the state automatically enforce 
the law, then a new law docs affect the payoff function and therefore the game 
played by the rest o f the citizens. But once everybody, including the enforcers 
of the law, are included in the game (as they should be), a law is nothing but 
some ink on paper. There being or not being such ink on paper cannot alter 
the game. This rather unusual conclusion, which is elaborated upon later in 
this section, is baffling at first sight. But this merely reflects the fact that the 
standard approach, though flawed, is deeply ingrained in modem social science 
thinking.
To digress for a moment, consider the new' literature on rights and liberty, 
which expresses rights as game forms.21 There has been much controversy 
about whether this is the correct way to describe rights. I wrnuld argue that, 
according to this conception of rights, a change in the stmeture of rights 
changes the sets of actions open to individuals and therefore changes the game.
But it is not clear w'hy a new rights assignment will change what I can do, 
even though it may w-cll change what I will do. I argue that granting a person, 
/, a right to do something, call it .v, must mean that if / does x, then another 
person J ,  will not have the right to do something (for instance, punch fs nose). 
Of course,/s not having the right to do something, in turn, must mean that if 
j  does do that thing, then others will acquire the rights to certain actions (typi­
cally' punitive actions against j)  to which they otherwise w'onld not have had 
a right.21 This is discussed in greater detail in Appendix B.
The above discussion may give the impression that law does not have any 
effect on society, that it is a chimera, but such an impression would be wrong. 
The law does not affect the payoff functions of the individuals or of the game, 
but it can influence the outcome of the game. It does so by creating focal points, 
and by' giving rise to beliefs and expectations in the minds of the individuals.’' 
Thus, in the above example, the policeman can choose between (a) and (b) 
and the judge between from among (1) and (2), but the policeman may believe 
that the judge will choose (1) if there is no antipollution law' in the state and 
(2) if there is an anlipollulion law' in effect. Hence, this may prompt the police­
man to choose (a) if, and only if, the law' is there. This in turn may mean that 
no one will pollute the atmosphere if, and only if, there is an anlipollulion law' 
in effect. Hence, the outcome of the game may well gel influenced by the law. 
But note that the law works here entirely through its influence on people's 
beliefs and opinions. A central thesis of this essay is that it cannot be otherwise. 
Law’s empire, tangible and all-encompassing as it may' seem, is founded on 
nothing but beliefs.
Of course, we will need to check that a particular outcome is self-enforcing 
(that is, an equilibrium solution) before we can say that the outcome wrill occur 
given the law. But the important point is that a law' can affect the outcome. 
and lhal in the final analysis, the law and the state are simply a self-supporting 
structure of beliefs and opinions. Hence, the order that one finds in very' differ­
ent kinds of collectivities—ranging from the totalitarian state to what anthro­
pologists, in their zoological moments, call the acephalous society—are self- 
enforcing outcomes.
What is a self-enforcing outcome or a reasonable equilibrium solution for a 
game is itself a controversial question. Over the last hvo decades solution 
concepts have proliferated rapidly.23 But it would be foolish to get drawn into 
that debate here. Hence, without further justification, we shall treat the set of 
Nash equilibrium outcomes1'1 as the self-enforcing set.3' So from here on, a 
reference to an "equilibrium’’ outcome is always to a Nash equilibrium.
Many games have the problem of there being too many Nash equilibriums. 
Consider a game in which you and another player will each have to choose 
one number (without letting the other player see what you are choosing) from 
among 3, 7, 9, and 100, If both of you choose the same number, each of you 
gets $1,000; if you choose different numbers, neither gels anything. In this
game the following pairs of choices are the only Nash equilibriums: (3,3), 
(7,7), (9,9), and (100,100). If you were playing this game, your essential prob­
lem is to try to guess what the other player will do. What complicates the guess 
is that what the other player does will depend on what she guesses you will 
do. One way of guessing is to try' to sec if a particular strategy is salient or 
“focal,” and to employ it in the expectation that the other player will do the 
same. If such a salient outcome exists, it is called a focal point?’ and predicting 
a focal outcome often turns out to be a good prediction. This method has no 
rigorous explanation but works through human psychology. In the above game, 
for instance, most human beings would choose 100. It is a large number, it is 
well-rounded, and somehow it stands out.
Nebulous though this method is, it works fairly well and has been used to 
great convenience. At Heathrow Airport there is an arbitrary' place with a large 
sign above it saying Meeting Point. If you plan to meet a friend at Heathrow 
Airport and fail to decide in advance where to wait for the friend, then in this 
game there are millions of Nash equilibriums. As long as both of you choose 
the same place you have a Nash equilibrium. It does not matter where that 
place is. The value of the sign is that it creates a focal point among all the 
possible Nash equilibriums. You would typically choose to wait under the sign 
and so would your friend. There is no hard reason for doing that, but you would 
expect the other player to do so, and that becomes reason enough. Putting up 
the sign Meeting Point does not change the game that you and your friend arc 
forced to play by virtue of having forgotten to decide where you will meet, 
but it nevertheless influences the outcome. The writing on the paper that consti­
tutes law is like the signboard in Heathrow. In itself it is quite a vacuous thing, 
but it creates expectations in the minds of individuals as to what the others 
will do; it creates focal points, and thereby influences the outcome.
Suppose now the airport authority at Heathrow, in trying to be helpful and 
not have people walk too far, puts up twenty signboards saying Meeting Point 
at different locations in the airport. You may then decide that it is futile to wait 
under one of these (since it is not clear which one you should wait under), and 
remembering that your friend is a bookworm, and he knows that you know 
that he is a bookworm, and you know that he knows that you know that he is 
a bookworm, and so on, you may go to the store. Books Etc., and wait for him 
there. In anticipation of this, he may also choose to go the bookstall. Whether 
he does so or not, in this case the well-meaning signboards fail to influence 
behavior and the outcome of the game. This can happen with the law as well. 
Poorly drafted legislation or legislation that lakes inadequate cognizance of 
individual incentives can fail to have effect on people's behavior or can have 
unintended effects by actually causing confusion. To avoid such poor quality 
legislation, we have to first understand how and when the law works in the 
first place. For that we have to cast aside the widespread view that law changes 
the payoff functions and, hence, the game.
Recall that social norms (of the equilibrium-selection variety) also are sim­
ply a mechanism for players to coordinate onto an equilibrium (or some out­
come within a certain set of equilibriums). It follows that actions and behavior 
(and therefore outcomes) that are enforceable by law' arc also enforceable by 
social norms. Since an outcome that is enforceable by the law is an equilibrium, 
we can always imagine norms (which lead to beliefs) that sustain the same 
actions, behavior, and outcome.37
To take an example, consider a society in which the law' allows you to drive 
on any side of the road, but the norm is to drive on the left. Since w'e have 
seen that if such a law' were there it w'ould be enforceable, it follows that this 
norm is also enforceable. This is an easy example because it is empirically 
transparent. In some remote parts of India, the hand of the law is so weak that 
it is indeed the case that, in effect, there is no law' about which side of the road 
to drive on. Yet people do drive on the left because once the norm is in place, 
there is no reason for one to violate it."'
Obedience to a tyrant also is best explained along these lines, since no one 
really fears the hurt the tyrant can himself bring upon one. 1 have previously- 
made use of a triadic model explaining this.'1 The subordinate's fear ot the 
tyrant, based on what the subordinate expects other subordinates to do to him 
should he disobey the tyrant, is what Hume w'as talking about w'hen he wrote: 
“No man would have any reason to fear the fury of a tyrant, if he had no 
authority over any but from fear; since, as a single man, his bodily force can 
reach but a small way, and all the farther power he posses must be found on 
our own opinion, or on the presumed opinion of others."''' (The second set of 
italics is mine.)
This brings us to the central proposition of this paper, which I’ve called the 
“core theorem."
Corf. Theorem: Whatever behavior and outcomes in society are legally 
enforceable are also enforceable through social norms.
This theorem has two immediate implications or corollaries.
First Corollary: What can be achieved through the law can, in principle, 
also be achieved without the law.
Second Corollary: I f  a certain outcome is not on equilibrium of the econ­
omy, then it cannot be implemented through any law.
Let us begin w'ilh the first corollary and, in particular, w'ith some examples. 
In India till fairly recent times, and in some parts even now, a w'idow w'as 
expected to lead a life of general abstinence: do not eat nonvegetarian food, 
wear black and white clothes, avoid close relationships with men, and so on. 
This social norm used to be adhered to very strictly in many parts of India. To 
an outside observer, unfamiliar with India, this would appear to be a practice 
enforced by law, just like in some Islamic states where the women are required
by law to wear the chador. Bui this appearance would be deceptive because 
there is no law that achieved this remarkable conformity in India. The confor­
mity was achieved entirely through a system of sanctions and threats of ostra­
cism. the threats themselves being given by individuals who feared that if they 
did not give such threats, they themselves would be ostracized. So this an 
example of behavior that wc would expect to be caused by the law but is 
actually the result of social norms. The rules of caste arc another example. The 
core theorem, in particular, the first corollary', challenges the myth that norms 
are somehow spontaneous and natural, while law's arc intrusive and unnatural.
Turning to a different setting, consider a researcher who is given the task of 
finding out the extent to which the press is free in different countries. The 
typical thing this person will do is find out what kinds of legal restrictions each 
country places on its scribes. She may also check on more general law's and 
statutes, such as the First Amendment in the United States, which guarantees 
freedom of speech to individuals and, therefore, also to the press. It has been 
found that in some countries the state persecutes its critics even when the law 
does not disallow' criticism; and so this researcher may go a step further and 
check the record of state persecution of journalists and television commenta­
tors. She would then somehow' combine all this information to decide in which 
nations the press is the most free and in which nations the least. To most of 
us, at least at first sight, this seems like a reasonable procedure.
In light of the core theorem, however, it turns out that this method of re­
search can yield seriously flawed results, because the method presumes that 
the only curb on press freedom can come from the nation’s laws and the state. 
But the theorem tells us that what the state can do, individual citizens, going 
about their daily chores, can also achieve. So it is not enough to observe the 
law and state or governmental action.
One may try to rebut this criticism by arguing that there are practical limits 
to what we can study; so when we look for whether certain freedoms are 
guaranteed in a certain nation, it is only natural to study the nation’s law and 
governmental behavior. Suppose we agree to this rebuttal. Then, of course, we 
have to use this criterion for all studies of a similar nature. Now suppose the 
researcher were asked to study the amount of freedom that the widow has in 
different nations. She would then have to say that the Indian widow is no 
less free than widows elsew'hcre in the world because she faced no legal or 
governmental restrictions on her behavior. This would then also be true of 
India several decades ago, when in some parts of the country' the widow was 
expected to commit suttee—bum herself on the dead husband’s pyre. Most of 
us would agree that the woman climbing on to the pyre was not, typically, 
committing a voluntary act. The voluntaiy act conclusion would be a folly 
stemming from the erroneous presumption that it is only the state that can curb 
individual voluntariness.
Newspapers and magazines come under all kinds of social—and in particu­
lar nongovernmental— pressures. If a newspaper criticiz es a wealthy business 
lobby, it can face debilitating cuts in advertisements, and so it may feel com­
pelled not to criticize the lobby. If it criticizes its government during an interna­
tional crisis and the people of that nation are sufficiently nationalistic, it may 
face a boycott by general readers, and fearing this, it may decide not to criticize 
the government. Once these extralegal constraints are taken into account, cer­
tain rankings become ambiguous. Between, for instance, China and the United 
States, it may be relatively easy to conclude that the latter has a more free 
press, even without studying social control, because the slate is so much more 
repressive in China; but between the States and India, the answer is less obvi­
ous. In terms of the law, the U.S. media are probably more free than the Indian 
ones; but the social and business sanctions seem to be greater on US newspa­
pers and television channels. This is not just because of the pressures of politi 
cal correctness, but there seems to be a wide recognition among corporations, 
lobbies, and power brokers in the United Stales that the control of opinion 
and information is an important ingredient for profit and survival. Even if my 
empirical conjecture about China, the U.S. and India is false, it still remains 
time that merely studying legal controls may be inadequate, not just for de­
termining press freedom but the freedom of the widow or the low caste:’1
Freedom of speech is similarly problematic. When you say that you believe 
that individuals should have the freedom to say what they want or what they 
believe in, the main problem, to my mind, is not the moral status or appeal of 
that statement but to understand what it means. If by the above declaration you 
mean that the set of feasible actions available to an individual should include 
his ability to make different speeches, then your commitment to free speech 
is pretty meaningless. It is based on the same flawed view of an economy that 
underlies some of the literature on rights that I have discussed above and exam­
ine in greater depth in Appendix B. Having a freedom or a right must be 
interpreted as other people not having certain freedoms or lights after you 
have exercised that freedom."2 And unless it is made at least partly clear what 
restriction one is willing to pul on other people’s freedom when guaranteeing a 
certain freedom to one person, the declaration that you believe in that freedom 
remains ambiguous.
An individual’s freedom of speech can be curbed by the slate; but it can 
also be curbed by the voluntary, atomistic actions of ordinary citizens.4' Some 
societies are temperamentally more prone to sanctioning one another’s speech 
and behavior, of being less tolerant of what one considers to be deviancy. If 
we arc committed to maximizing the freedom of speech and recognize that 
such freedom is not just a matter of law but also social norms, wc may have 
to contend with the even more difficult problem that arises from the possibility 
that one person’s exercising of his or her freedom of speech can result in the 
curtailment of another's freedom.14
Auolher example of how the meaning of “freedom” can quickly become 
complicated occurs in the context of labor markets. Most people believe that 
slavery is coercion but that modern lahor markets are voluntary. Those who 
study developing societies agree that bonded labor is unfrcc but that wage 
labor is voluntary. But once one goes beyond contemporary, industrialized 
society to consider examples of labor markets from primitive societies or by­
gone eras, the dividing line between what is free and what is not is not so clear, 
as one encounters institutions that appear strange to the modem observer.*5 
Morever, on returning to contemporary markets, after such a journey, the divid­
ing lines that had earlier seemed obvious also appear less sharp. It is true that 
in the light of the core theorem, individual freedoms become vastly more diffi­
cult to compute. But that cannot be reason enough for confining our atlcution 
to the law and the behavior of government when studying individual freedom.
Let us now turn to the second corollary. According to this, if we have a law, 
the adherence to which entails out-of-equilibrium behavior on the pail of some 
individual, then such a law is doomed to failure; it can never be enforced. This 
is because according to the core theorem, the law can achieve only what a 
social norm can achieve. And since a social norm simply selects an equilib­
rium, no law can induce a non-equilibrium outcome.27' Attempts to induce such 
an outcome would either result in the law being inconsequential or have unin­
tended effects on the economy. Ellickson’s claim that there can be “order with­
out law" is now easy to understand, as is the converse of that claim: disorder 
despite law.17
Considering the core theorem, the question must arise, in what way is the 
law different from nomis, since up to now we have shown how, in certain 
important respects, they look very similar? To answer this we have to recognize 
that the economy, described as a game, ignores a lot of information concerning 
prior beliefs and histories, which is a part of the real economy. In reality, even 
before a specific law is enacted there exists a predefined set of roles for various 
players concerning the way they should relate to the law, whenever the law is. 
The players are, of course, free to violate these rules, but they are nonetheless 
there. Thus the traffic policeman is supposed to follow the rule that he should 
stop drivers who violate the traffic law-s. This instruction to the traffic police 
remains in force no matter what the traffic laws are. The ordinary citizen is 
supposed to follow' the rule that he or she respects the orders of the traffic 
police.1** The judge is supposed to follow the rule that he should punish the 
person who violates the law', and this remains valid no matter what the law is. 
Even if the speed limit is changed, the judge’s rule remains the same. These 
prior rules and institutions may be referred to as “quasi-laws,” “quasi-norms,” 
or as "standing orders.” The qualifier quasi reminds us that on their own they 
may not have any bite. The rule that the policeman should stop a car that 
breaks the speed limit is not an operational law till the speed limit is specified.
But once the speed limit law' is specified, the quasi-laws come to life. The 
speed limit law thrown in w'ith the preexisting quasi-law's is much more than 
a law that simply says that a driver must not cross 65 mph. It is a law (or a set 
of laws, if we want to emphasize its reach) that specifics behavior rules for 
various people—the driver, of course, but also the policeman, the magistrate, 
and also, frequently, the ordinary citizen (who, for instance, may not obstruct 
a policeman carrying out his duty). The role of quasi-laws is illustrated with 
an example in Appendix A.
Given that all modern societies have predefined rules or standing orders for 
people with respect to the law, which are independent of what the actual law' 
is, this means that when new law's are enacted, the set of supporting activities 
and behavior by the various citizens do not have to be specified separately 
each time. It is this preexisting structure of rules and instmetions, along with 
the expectations in people’s mind, that these wri 11 be adhered to as long as they 
are not against the adherer's self-interest, which make it possible for the laws 
to be implemented. For any law', the full ramification of what it implies for 
individual behavior is enormous. Suppose Montana enacts a new' speed limit 
legislation. This does not ask just drivers to behave in a certain way; it also 
asks traffic wardens to behave in a certain way, judges to behave in a certain 
way, and so on. w The existence of preexisting rules (and, therefore, expecta­
tions) for laws is what makes a law different from a norm. If the Montana 
speed limit were to be introduced as a norm, all the supporting behaviors by 
the various agents would have to be specified, since norms do not have the 
advantage of preexisting rules and expectations. So, though for each imple- 
mentable law' there is also a norm that would yield the same outcome, the full 
statement of that norm would be enormously complicated.
The histories of norms and laws are also different.”1 Usually (though not 
always) social norms appear through long processes of evolution. Similar acts 
repeated over time can become a norm. To quote Ullmann-Margalit: “Norms 
as a rule do not come into existence at a definite point in time, nor are they 
the result of a manageable number of identifiable acts. They are, rather, the 
resultant of complex patterns of behavior of a large number of people over a 
protracted period of time.”51 Even some very sharply defined social norms and 
customs, such as the caste system or eating habits of different peoples, have 
such distant and diffused origins that there may be no agreement among histo­
rians as to w'here they came from. The law, on the other hand, is normally a 
product of deliberate choices, with dates of their enactment frequently known. 
Of course there arc exceptions. The laws that certain tribes follow often merge 
into what w'c think of as norms; even in modern societies there are laws that 
emerged from common customs. This is true, for instance, of English common 
law, and the U.S. practice of relying on interpretive principles and judicial 
rulings.52 Conversely, there are some norms which arc deliberate decisions.
But norms are difficult to change, since norms do not have the paraphernalia 
of preexisting rules, which can be used to usher in a new norm. On the other 
hand, norms may well be more robust than the law, because just as most norms 
were not deliberately instituted, it is difficult to deliberately discard them.
Concludi ng  Remarks
In the previous sections I have discussed how to correctly model the role of 
law in an economy. There are. however, situations where we may willfully 
choose to reject the correct method, just as economists often do a partial equi­
librium analysis where, strictly speaking, they should be doing a general equi­
librium analysis. Indeed, it is possible to view the standard literature on law 
and economics as something akin to partial equilibrium analysis. It presumes 
law-abiding behavior on the part of the law enforcement officers. Even in more 
sophisticated models that allow for bribery and other kinds ot lapses, ulti­
mately (and often implicitly) there is a layer of enforcement that is assumed 
to be automatic. This can work within limits, and if wc are lucky, those who 
are assumed to do the job automatically actually find it in their interest to do 
so. But surely, instead of working with models that rely on our keeping our 
fingers crossed, it would be better to approach modeling law and economics 
as suggested here.
If one does adopt this approach to law and economics, it will have implica­
tions for several related areas of research, notably, the study of government 
and the stale. In general, economists have been quite cavalier in modeling 
government. It has usually been treated as an exogenous agent or a puppet 
organization, carrying out the advice of economists (thereby providing a raison 
d'etre for policy economists). Even when economists have gone beyond this, 
Lhey have generally taken a simplistic or mechanical view' of government.'" 
This essay draws our attention to the fact that both the enforcers of the law 
and, for want of a belter word, the enforcees need to be modeled together, as 
strategic agents, having volition and choice. Such a construction will not be 
easy and will not happen all at once, but it is a target worth keeping in mind.
A P P E N D I X  A:  LAW AND E N F O R C E M E N T
This Appendix illustrates formally some of the principles discussed in the 
main text. I proceed here entirely through an example.
For most games that economists talk about, it is possible to define a larger 
game by adding on to it the possibility of punitive actions after the end of the 
main game. Thus chess is a game, but at the end of a game of chess, I can 
sock my opponent in the nose, he can sock me back, and so on. So for every 
game G, wre can define an “expanded game” GE, which appends to G a string 
of punitive actions.
1 shall consider a very simple game G. This game consists of one player, 
called player !, who has to choose any action from the set [0,1]. His payoff 
function is as follows. If he chooses r e  [0,1], then he gets a payoff of x. Wc 
could think of an action as the amount of pollution generated by him. This 
lakes a value between 0 and I. The more he pollutes the more profit he 
earns. Call this game G. If this was all there was, player 1 would pollute up to 
level 1.
Now consider the expanded game GE. In period 0 of Gt, player I plays the 
above game G. In period 1 player 2 can choose between P (punish the other 
player) and N (not punish the other player). In period 2 player 1 chooses be­
tween P and N; in period 3 player 2 chooses between P and N: and so on ad 
infinitum. Suppose in period r (> 1), player i has to move. Then if i plays P, 
player j  (* i) earns -  B (where B > 0) in that period and / cams 0; and if i plays 
N, both earn 0. In other words, punishment hurts and inflicting a punishment is 
costless and joyless (it will be interesting to modify this assumption). Both 
players have a discount factor of 5 e (0.1).
What we are interested in checking is how much pollution can be controlled 
through legislation. To keep the analysis simple, we shall assume that there is 
the following "preexisting quasi-law.” This is simply a contingent definition.
At any time period t > I, agent Fs chosen action will be called illegal if he 
chooses P (i.e., punishes the other player), though player/s move at time I -  
I was legal (i.e., not illegal) or he chooses N, though/ s move at t — I was 
illegal.
In words, what wc are saying is this: (a) It is illegal to punish someone who 
has done nothing illegal and (b) it is illegal to not punish someone who has 
violated the law. Wc can think of other kinds of quasi-laws—for instance, we 
may think of dropping (b).
This preexisting quasi-law has no bite till we specify a law' regarding what 
constitutes an illegal move in game G, and that is the reason I refer to it as 
quasi-law. Consider a possible law, which I will call "the pollution law.” In
period 0, if player 1 chooses any action greater than a, where a  is a given 
number in [0,1), then 1’s action is illegal.
The pollution law, coupled with the preexisting partial law, is a well-defined 
law—let us call it a “legal system"—which allows us to classify every action 
in every play of the game as either legal or illegal. Given a play of the game, 
a person is described as law abiding if he or she makes no illegal moves.
Note that the legal system that we are considering is parameterized by a. 
We want to investigate for which a ’s is the legal system enforceable in the 
sense that there exists a Nash equilibrium outcome where everybody is law 
abiding.
Observe that a new pollution law or, for that matter, a new legal system, 
leaves the strategy sets and payoff functions (and therefore the game) un­
changed. As in the main text, the legal system can nevertheless influence be­
havior by affecting everybody's expectation about everybody else’s behavior, 
as long as it is enforceable.
To check this, suppose both players are law abiding. In particular, let us 
suppose that 1 decides to play a  in period 0 (i.e„ the highest possible legal 
move) and be law abiding throughout. To check if this is an equilibrium, we 
have to verify that no one stands to benefit by deviating unilaterally.
If both are law abiding. 1 gets a payoff of a  and 2 gets a payoff of 0. Clearly, 
2 cannot do better through any deviation since 0 is the highest she can earn in 
this game. Consider 1 \s strategy if 1 decides to deviate from being law abiding. 
It is easy to see that the best deviation is to play 1 in period 0 and from then 
on to make only legal moves. That will of course invite punishment from 
player 2 (since she is law abiding) in period 1. After then, it is not worthwhile 
for player 1 to play P because that, and only that, will prompt player 2 to play 
P in the following period. Hence, if 1 deviates from being law abiding, 1’s 
highest possible payoff is 1 -  5B. Thus, 1 will not deviate if, and only if, 
a  > I -  5p
It follows that the only pollution laws that are enforceable are ones that 
permit people to pollute up to some level at least as high as 1 -  5B. If 1 -  
5B > 0 and the pollution law sets a  e [0, I -  SB), then a behavior in conformity 
with the law cannot be enforced in any way. Since the law cannot change the 
game, a pollution level below 1 -  SB is impossible in this society.
A P P E N D I X  B:  L I B E R T Y ,  R I G H T S .  A N D  G A M E S
The literature on liberty and rights that emerged from social choice theory^ 
has gradually moved to a representation of rights as game forms.” This repre­
sentation of rights has been the source of some controversy. The discussion of 
norms and law undertaken here suggests a new line of criticism of this ap­
proach. According to the rights-as-game-form approach, every assignment of 
individual rights translates into a game; thus a change in rights is represented 
by a change in the game being played by the players, since rights determine 
the strategies available to a player. Thus if i does not have the right to steal /’s 
wallet, that option is typically omitted from ps available strategies or actions.
It is arguable, however, that Ps not having a right to do something does not 
mean i cannot do that thing, so a change in rights should not be thought of as 
causing a change in the feasible set of actions. Stepping back from these aca­
demic debates, let us ask ourselves w'hat it means to say: “Person i does not 
have the right to steal /’s wallet." It means that if i does steal j ':s wallet, then 
someone else (j or a policeman) has the right to take some punitive action (y) 
against /, which otherwise that person would not have the right to do. Thus, i 
having a right to action ;  means that if / chooses c, then someone else j  will 
not have a right to some action y that punishes i. This interdependent character 
of rights is very similar to the law' described in Appendix A. Hence, a rights 
structure can influence what happens in the game, but it does not do so by 
influencing the game itself.
The above idea of interdependence of rights has been stressed by several 
writers. Hart writes that “to have a right entails having a moral justification 
for limiting the freedom of another person and for determining how he should 
act.”'5 More pertinently, Lyons argues: “When others are under an obligation 
to me and threaten to default, there are actions I might appropriately lake which 
I would not otherwise be justified in taking."57
To illustrate a rights structure of this kind, consider the game GR in Appendix 
A. Think of action P as punching the other person in the nose or some such 
action to which no one has a right normally, but could acquire a right by virtue 
of the person in question doing something wrong or hurting one's right in the 
first place. Think of the twm players in the game as neighbors and the actions 
open to player 1 in period 0 (given by the set [0,1]) as different levels of 
pollution from some activity in his backyard, which has a negative externality 
for player 2 but gives happiness to I .
A rights structure can be defined by a basic right parameterized by a  and 
other (contingent) rights. Let us suppose that by this society’s values, 1 has 
the right to choose pollution levels up to a; but no more. If he chooses a 
pollution level s > a, then in period 1 player 2 acquires the right to choose P.
If, however, in period 0, 1 chooses s > a  and in period 1, 2 chooses P, then in 
period 3, 1 acquires ihe right to choose P, and so on. More formally, this may 
be stated as follows.
At time t > 1, if it is player i’s move, we shall say that i chooses an action 
to which he or she does not have a right if that action happens to be P and if 
in period t -  1 agent j  (4 f) had chosen an action to which he or she had a right 
(i.c., did not choose an action to which he or she did not have a right). This, 
coupled with the initial assumption that 1 in period 0 does not have a right to 
choose s > a, where a  e [0,1 ], defines a rights structure.
Now when the game is played we can evaluate the outcome as one that does 
or does not respect the rights structure. So in this formulation, it is not a game 
that can satisfy or violate rights, but it is the outcome that can he put to this 
test. And, as with equilibrium-selection norms and law, a rights structure can 
potentially be enforced only if it is such that the intersection between the set 
of outcomes that satisfy the rights structure and the set of equilibrium outcomes 
is nonempty. No amount of policing or state intervention can change this fact, 
since the enforcers are already a part of the game and cannot do anything that 
was not already a part of their strategy sets.
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